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Abstract 
Purpose: This paper examines the discourses that influence policy and practice in social 
enterprises.  In institutional circles, arguments are shaped by the desire to protect assets for 
the community, while entrepreneurial discourses favour a mixture of investment sources, 
surplus sharing and inclusive systems of governance.  A critique is outlined that challenges 
policy-makers and academics to move beyond the heated debate on „business-like‟ activity 
through a deeper understanding of the social relations entered into (and created by) different 
social entrepreneurial activities.   
Design/Methodology/Approach: The paper is wholly theoretical.  Firstly, contradictions are 
exposed through a review of practitioner and scholarly literature.  Thereafter, empirically 
grounded studies are used to develop a theoretical model that accommodates and accounts 
for diverse practices.  A broader perspective, that views human behaviour as a product of, 
and support system for, our socio-sexual choices, is deployed to extend understanding of 
social capital.  By integrating this into governance theory, workplaces come to be seen as 
complex centres of community-building replete with economic and social goals.  The concept 
of „social rationality‟ is elaborated as an alternative way to understand the legitimacy of social 
entrepreneurial activity and management practice. 
Originality/Value: The paper concludes by developing a framework and typology that 
theorises social enterprise as a heterogeneous business movement.  Each form of social 
enterprise integrates socially rational thinking into its policies and practices.  This suggests a 
different educational agenda for social entrepreneurs oriented towards the equitable 
distribution, and not accumulation, of social and economic capital. 
Keywords: Social Enterprise, Governance, Social Rationality, Social Capital, Co-operative 
Practice 
Paper Type: Conceptual paper 
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Introduction 
What is the goal of social enterprise policy?  Entrepreneurial and government arguments 
differ over whether the goal of social enterprise policy is the creation of a „not-for-profit‟ or a 
„more-than-profit‟ business movement (Haugh, 2005; Allen, 2005).  In institutional policy 
circles, arguments are shaped by the desire to protect assets for community use (DTI, 2002, 
2003; Pearce, 2003), while entrepreneurial discourses favour a mixture of investment 
sources, surplus sharing and inclusive systems of governance (Ridley-Duff, 2002; Harding 
and Cowling, 2004; Wallace, 2005; Brown, 2006).  In short, different philosophical 
commitments induce a variety of approaches to ownership and control that, in turn, serve 
divergent interests (Brown, 2006; Ridley-Duff, 2007). 
This paper argues that focussing on „profit‟ arguments obscures underlying similarities and 
differences in organizational practices across economic sectors.  By drawing on Etzioni‟s 
(1988) decision-making model, as well as a variety of empirically grounded studies, the 
reasons behind diverse practices in social enterprise – as well as their different foci – are 
exposed. 
In the next section, the underlying values that inform „not-for-profit‟ and „more-than-profit‟ 
discourses are discussed: both reflect ideological positions on the nature of business and the 
way that profits can be used and distributed.  This reveals underlying contradictions that 
need resolution through new theory.  This is followed by a section on the way social capital 
theory has been used to understand social enterprises.  In particular, the desire for, and 
obligations that spring from emotional, sexual and family relationships are given more 
emphasis than in previous discussions of social enterprise.  These concepts are then drawn 
together in a section that integrates the models of Billis (1993) and Turnbull (1994, 1995) into 
a new model.  The new model is then applied to develop a new typology of the sector that 
accommodates and explains the diverse practices reported, as well as the unique position of 
co-operatives (and multi-stakeholder businesses) in the broader economy.  The result is a 
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framework that reflects the heterogeneity of social processes that drive social enterprise 
development. 
Concepts of Social Enterprise 
Pearce (2003) has produced one of the first key texts in the field.  His accessible book, 
oriented toward practitioners more than academics, is frequently referenced in both popular 
and academic writing.  Pearce explores the various shades of social enterprise definition and 
elaborates at length.  While there is near unanimity regarding the primacy of „social 
objectives‟, different individuals and agencies elaborate a variety of ways to achieve them:  
…[in social enterprises] all assets and accumulated wealth are not in the ownership of 
individuals….1 
…[social enterprises are] independent…and provide services, goods and trade for a social 
purpose and are non-profit distributing…2 
…[in social enterprises] profits are used to create more jobs and businesses and to generate 
wealth for the benefit of the community…3 
Pearce (2003: 32-33) 
These words articulate the so-called „not-for-profit‟ discourse on social enterprise.  On close 
examination, however, it becomes clear there is no ideological objection to the idea that 
assets and capital can be accumulated.  It is apparent in the first quotation that collective 
rather than individual assets are preferred.  In the second and third quotes, however, 
contradictions become apparent.  One view is that profits should not be distributed; the other 
view is that profit distribution is the purpose of social enterprise.  Haugh (2005:3), therefore, 
clarifies who is barred from receiving profits when she argues that “social enterprises are 
prevented from distributing their profits to those who exercise control over them.”   
All these definitions share a tacit assumption that the purpose of a „not-for-profit‟ orientation 
is to encourage high levels of reinvestment in economic activity.  It is this aspect that has 
been widely promoted in the DTI‟s own definition of social enterprise as “a business with 
primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose” (DTI, 
2002, cited in Pearce, 2003:32).  While the DTI strategy, and Community Interest Company 
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(CIC) legislation, does not directly ban distribution of surpluses to individuals (by allowing, for 
example, staff bonuses and employee share schemes), „not-for-profit‟ rhetoric pervades both 
policy documents and academic debate (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001). 
Profit-making per se, however, is not the issue.  Indeed, in all the above social enterprise 
definitions, there is an implicit assumption that profits are desirable so long as they can be 
channelled towards the collective needs of socially excluded groups, rather than already 
wealthy individuals.  This view of social enterprise, therefore, is redistributive with strong 
ideological commitments against individual appropriation of wealth and an emphasis on the 
„common good‟.  Such communitarian sentiments place emphasis on collective over 
individual good to develop arguments for greater civic and social responsibility (see Etzioni, 
1995, 1998; Collins, 1997; Tam, 1999; Lutz, 2000).   
Critics, however, draw attention to two problems.  Firstly, hierarchies and oligarchies may 
rapidly develop that allow elites to control resources regardless of the precise ownership and 
control mechanisms established (Michels, 1961; Vanek, 1977; Cornforth et al, 1988).  
Secondly, emphasising collective over individual rights often becomes oppressive to 
individuals (and out of favour groups) by legitimating „collective‟ solutions that are 
expressions of managerial interests (see Willmott, 1993; Starrat, 2001; Parker, 2002; 
Johnson, 2006). 
On the question of surplus distribution, several authors have argued that non-profit 
orientations, and particularly asset-locks, create long-term investment problems.  Working for 
wages denies capital gains to the very people creating them and demotivates stakeholders 
through „equity devaluation‟ (Major and Boby, 2000).  This creates resentment towards 
stakeholders who appropriate benefits without making equitable contributions.  Barred from 
capital growth, workers (sometimes led by managers) increase wage levels to extract surplus 
value so that private investments can be made elsewhere.  The organisation at best 
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stagnates, or at worst slowly bleeds to death, as a result of chronic underinvestment (Vanek, 
1977; Cornforth et al., 1988; Major, 1996, 1998). 
A more robust model, argue Major and Boby (2000), is one that uses individual and collective 
ownership to entrench a variety of long-term interests that promote competition between 
short and long-term priorities.  This binds the fortunes of all stakeholders to the sustainability 
of the enterprise.  By doing this, thinking shifts towards the achievement of „equilibrio‟ 
between different interest groups so that there is a balance between personal, collective and 
strategic goals.  Equilibrio does not translate easily into English.  In essence, it applies to the 
pursuit of balanced governance in a number of work-related debates (Whyte and Whyte, 
1991).  Oakeshott (1990:201) elaborates by illustrating each of the interests that are 
mediated: capital and labour; individual and collective interests; democratic and line 
management; enterprise and community interests (compare Morrison, 1991).  There is 
evidence that such thinking is gaining momentum in the UK through the adoption of „balance‟ 
as a guiding principle in the construction of social enterprise support tools (Bull and 
Crompton, 2006; Bull, 2006). 
In summary, therefore, the „not-for-profit‟ characterisation of social enterprise obscures a 
complex set of philosophical and moral commitments regarding who can profit from its 
operation and how these profits can be used.  As a constitutional settlement (in the form of a 
Company Limited by Guarantee or Community Interest Company) it legitimises collective 
rights/responsibilities that may lead to marginalisation of individual and minority group 
interests.  It is important to distinguish this argument from the „non for private profit‟ argument 
made by others (see Nicholls, 2006).  The „non-profit‟ orientation here is regarded as a 
philosophical commitment to privilege the collective (a set of individuals who constitute an „in-
group‟) over other individuals, rather than the public over the private.  Surpluses can be 
enjoyed collectively within the boundaries of the organisation or distributed to other 
collectives legitimised by the „in-group‟.  This antagonism to individual rights and the 
individualisation of benefits, however, is not held across the entire social enterprise sector. 
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More-than-Profit Views of Social Enterprise 
As Defourny (2001:23) acknowledges, “the NPO4 literature is not able to embrace the whole 
reality of the social enterprise”.  Firstly, surplus redistribution constraints do not apply to all 
organisations that define themselves (or are defined by others) as social enterprises.  
Worker, marketing and consumer co-operatives distribute profits to individuals and have 
developed democratic know-how that encourages equity in the allocation of social and 
economic benefits (Rothschild and Allen-Whitt, 1986; Whyte and Whyte, 1991; 
Cornforth, 1995; Turnbull, 1995). 
A clear distinction between co-operative and private businesses, however, remains.  
Dividends are payable to those who make both a financial and a labour investment.  In 
worker co-operatives dividends are payable to those who both work and invest in the 
enterprise.  In Spain, the concept of employment and wages has been eroded to the point 
where members receive monthly „anticipos‟ (anticipated profits) that are adjusted at the end 
of each year (Whyte and Whyte, 1991).  In marketing co-operatives, suppliers combine their 
product offerings to enhance their market profile.  Without committing their produce, 
however, no dividends are received.  In consumer co-operatives, benefits accrue only to 
those who buy their goods through the enterprise.  A person must walk the aisles to earn 
dividends.  In all cases, labour investments are expected from members in return for 
individualised benefits.  Conventional private companies, conversely, do not require labour 
contributions before distributing surpluses to financial investors. 
The realisation that some social enterprises are not ideologically hostile to declaring profits or 
sharing surpluses has prompted high-profile figures to talk of a „more than profit‟ orientation.  
At the Social Enterprise Institute Conference in 20035, Liam Black  (then Social Entrepreneur 
of the Year) asked the audience in his keynote speech to repeat after him „profit is good‟ 
because it funds future social investment.  This was echoed in the opening speech of Declan 
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Jones (Director of the Social Enterprise Institute) and closing speech of Jonathan Bland 
(Director of the Social Enterprise Coalition) who both asked for a „more-than-profit‟ mentality. 
This flexibility is reflected in the definition used by the Social Enterprise Coalition: 
A social enterprise is not defined by its legal status but by its nature: its social aims and 
outcomes; the basis on which its social mission is embedded in its structure and governance; 
and the way it uses the profits it generates through trading activities. 
(NEF / SAS
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, 2004:8)  
Based on this definition, not only co-operative enterprises, but also majority 
employee-owned, and multi-stakeholder enterprises, can be included under the social 
enterprise banner (Gates, 1998; Allen, 2005; Brown, 2006).  In these organisations, 
individual investment and payouts are permitted.  External investors may also be allowed a 
„reasonable‟ return on an equity investment.  Fair trade networks provide examples of supply 
chains based on trading relationships between worker, marketing and consumer 
co-operatives that deliver produce to supermarkets and retail outlets (see Jones, 2000; Allen, 
2005).  Gates (1998:13) argues that this combination of investor, worker and consumer 
ownership can alter management practices: 
“Inside” ownership improves performance both directly (by encouraging insider challenges to 
poorly conceived management decisions) and indirectly – by influencing managers who know 
that the firm’s owners are now working amongst them.  Similarly, by including a component of 
consumer ownership, the utility’s managers (and their families) would live among 
shareholders who are also neighbors, schoolmates and teammates.  Such a 
community-focused ownership stake could change the quality of business relationships…. 
Gates stresses the role of individuals (and intellectual autonomy) in shaping decisions.  In a 
way that echoes anarchist economics (see Veblen, 1898; Ward, 1966; Rothschild and 
Allen-Whitt, 1986), contemporary liberalism views individual voluntary action as a way to 
check the development of formal collective power.  By enhancing individual rights and 
autonomy, monopoly control over resources, information and debating forums is subjected to 
continual challenge. 
The view that pursuing social goals can be compatible with economic efficiency, and that 
individual empowerment can create a stronger collective, brings social enterprise into a 
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common discourse adopted by some private sector businesses.  Viewing social enterprises 
as double (or triple) bottom line businesses places them in an alliance with parts of the 
private sector.  As John Young of Hewlett-Packard states: 
Our basic principles have endured intact since our founders conceived them.  We distinguish 
between core values and practices; the core values don’t’ change, but the practices might.  
We’ve also remained clear that profit – as important as it is – is not why the Hewlett-Packard 
Company exists; it exists for more fundamental reasons. 
(Cited in Collins and Porras, 2000:46) 
Those „fundamental‟ reasons are illustrated at Merck, discussed in a chapter about 
companies that are „built to last‟.  A key reason, suggest the authors, is that all companies 
adopt a “more than profits” mentality (Collins and Porras, 2000:47).  Merck‟s founder claims 
workers are “genuinely inspired by the ideals of advancement of medical science, and of 
service to humanity”.  Despite the popular pastime of attacking the profits of drug companies, 
Merck‟s activities merit comparison to social enterprise activity: 
…Merck elected to develop and give away Mectizan, a drug to cure “river blindness,” a 
disease that infected over a million people in the Third World with parasitic worms that 
swarmed through body tissue and eventually into the eyes, causing painful blindness.  A 
million customers is a good-sized market, except that these were customers who could not 
afford the product.  Knowing that the project would not produce a large return on investment – 
if it produced one at all – the company nonetheless went forward with the hope that some 
government agencies or other third parties would purchase and distribute the product once 
available.  No such luck, so Merck elected to give the drug away free to all who needed it...at 
its own expense.
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When asked why it had done this, Merck executives pointed to the need to accommodate the 
views, and maintain the morale, of its scientists (Collins and Porras, 2000).   
Stories of “great” companies driven by social values rather than profits create problems for 
those on both sides of the Atlantic seeking to distinguish social from private enterprise on 
ethical grounds (Collins, 1997; Laville and Nyssens, 2001).  Moreover, it compromises those 
who would argue that co-operatives are a „truer‟ form of social enterprise than other models.  
Mainstream businesses, and not just those currently identified as part of the social enterprise 
sector, can lay some claim to effective stakeholder involvement, commitment to diversity, and 
practices that address social exclusion as part of their strategy for economic and social 
8 
success (Kotter & Heskett, 1992; Collins, 2001; Vinten, 2001; Wieland, 2005).  Does this 
mean that „social enterprise‟ is a meaningless concept?  Not necessarily.  As Collins (2001) 
analysis of private business illustrates, the current distinctions between private and social 
enterprise may be artificial and not grounded in differences at the level of empirical findings.  
Collins distinguishes between the practices that underpin „good‟ and „great‟ companies, and 
shows how „great‟ companies are more social in orientation by including staff from across the 
organisation, and from outside the ranks of management, in key debating and development 
forums.  This commitment to pluralism (embracing and acting upon the views of people 
whose interests differ) is a hallmark of their social structure.  The question, therefore, is not 
whether the concept of social enterprise is meaningless, but whether there is a theoretical 
framework that can tie these findings together and explain them coherently. 
The works of Billis (1993) and Turnbull (1994, 1995) are helpful here.  As Seanor and 
Meaton (2006) discuss, Billis‟s model (Figure 1) describes three organisational worlds: one 
rooted in voluntary association; a second deriving from market trading; a third rooted in 
public service.  These three worlds each have their own culture and rules for workplace 
organisation: they accommodate and establish different governance practices and value 
commitments.  Moreover, they can overlap with the result that hybrid organisational forms 
develop to serve multiple interests.  Seanor and Meaton (2006), in presenting their paper,  
suggested that social enterprise activity (and enterprises) are located at the cross-over points 
between the three worlds8.  Taking the model one step further posits a view that social 
enterprise does not fill gaps in a market economy, but several gaps where tensions arise 
between multiple ideologies rooted in different ways of living. 
9 
Figure 1 – The Locus of Social Enterprise Activity - Based on Billis (1993) 
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This model, suggesting that social enterprises locate themselves at the cross-over points 
between „worlds‟ has more explanatory appeal considering the findings of other studies as 
well as the contradictions set out earlier.  It goes beyond Defourny‟s (2001) argument that 
social enterprise occupies space between voluntary (non-profit) and co-operative (profit-
making) businesses.  It also moves beyond the model propagated by Pearce (2003) that 
sees social enterprise as a sub-set of the social economy.  In its place is a model that not 
only accommodates trading for a charitable purpose, but also corporate social responsibility 
and public sector enterprise. 
Problems remain.  Firstly, Billis attempts to integrate the personal world into the model.  The 
contention that the personal world only overlaps the „voluntary association‟ world (Billis, 
1993:166) is not sustainable in the face of recent work.  In social capital debates the role of 
intimate relationships and family ties was originally seen as important in organisation 
development, but is sidelined when applied to social enterprise (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 
1995; Evers, 2001; Laville and Nyssens, 2001).  In social network theory, attention is drawn 
to the continued dominance of intimate relationships and friendship networks as a way of 
explaining recruitment and selection outcomes in employment (Barnes, 1954; Granovetter, 
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1983).  Research into employee involvement not only highlights the emotional highs of 
embracing a strong „community‟ orientation (Kanter, 1985), but also how the activity of 
„championing‟ participative management can be a strategy of individuals attempting a rapid 
climb of corporate ladders (Marchington, 2005).  Last, and certainly not least, emotional 
commitments (to other people as well as social norms) have a pivotal place in Etzioni‟s 
analysis of corporate governance practices (Etzioni, 1988).   
Secondly, the position of co-operatives in the Billis model is neither clear nor compelling.  As 
Pearce (2003) points out, co-operatives exist not just as local level community enterprises (in 
the „Voluntary Association‟ world), but also as national and multinational corporations 
(Ransom, 2004).  Co-operative practices (whether labelled as such or not) have also been 
repeatedly associated with sustainable success in the „private‟ sector (Kotter & Heskett, 
1992; Cheney, 1999; Collins, 2001).  As a result, it may be better to see cooperativism as an 
expression of a pluralist (decentralising) approach to governance rather than a particular type 
of business.   
It is here that the work of Turnbull (1994, 1995) is most enlightening (see Figure 2).  His 
analysis of the governance model in use throughout the Mondragon Cooperative 
Corporation9 is grounded in the finding that power is distributed to three distinct interest 
groups: those pursuing social and family interests (workers), those engaged in governing 
practices (governors), those organising production practices (managers).  It is not 
coincidental, perhaps, that Turnbull‟s governing model so closely follows the earlier models 
of Dunlop (1958) and Billis (1993) .  Dunlop identified three groups (workers, employers and 
community institutions) that compete to influence workplace practices and the system of 
rules that govern them.  Turnbull (1994) illustrates how these groups share power internally 
at Mondragon.  The sovereign power of a unitary board is replaced by a General Assembly 
(with all stakeholders as members). Figure 2 illustrates how divergent ideologies and 
interests can be accommodated through these pluralist practices within the context of a 
single organisation.  Pluralism in governance legitimises divergent interests (and interest 
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groups) and their social practices but also creates the mechanisms through which tensions 
can be resolved through debate (either in forums that bridge the boundary between two 
groups, or in a general assembly where all interests are reconciled). 
Figure 2 – Superimposing Turnbull’s Model of Governance  
onto Seanor and Meaton’s Extended Model 
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The pluralism articulated in the above model runs counter to the arguments developed by 
Dart (2004).  Dart suggests that the task-oriented focus and business rhetoric dominating 
social enterprise can be viewed as the encroachment of business practices into both the 
„government‟ and „voluntary association‟ worlds.  In his view, therefore, social enterprise is 
moving away from the pluralist practices characteristic of „great‟ business and co-operatives 
towards a unitarist outlook that privileges „business-like‟ approaches.  Dart contends that this 
discourse is growing, and is likely to continue undermining alternative approaches.  If this is 
the case, the „business model‟ for social enterprise is in need of re-examination to establish 
whether it is appropriate to use liberal economic thinking as the basis for the social economy. 
In this section there has been an exploration of the ideological commitments that motivate 
particular forms of social enterprise activity.  The “not for profit” argument emphasises the 
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collective over the individual, while the “more than profit” argument depends to a greater 
extent on individual rights and powers to challenge corporate control (whether in the social or 
private sector).  Rather than attempting to argue that one is better, or more legitimate, there 
is an attempt to legitimise and explain variations through the adoption of a pluralist outlook.  
The work of Billis, Turnbull, and Seanor and Meaton have been suggested as a foundation 
for new theory regarding the boundaries and nature of the social enterprise sector..   
Before this can be fully developed, however, it is necessary to address how sexual desires, 
interests and obligations have been ignored in discussions of social capital.  The next section 
develops the argument for a broader framework that recognises and accommodates 
courtship, friendship, child-raising and caring responsibilities as themes that need 
accommodation in any definition of social enterprise.. 
Social Capital and Social Rationality 
The concept of „social capital‟ was popularised by Coleman (1988).  Later, Putnam (1993, 
1995) applied the concept to the process of „civic engagement‟ in support of Habermasian 
ideas about debate in public forums (Habermas et al, 1974).  Coleman and Putnam each 
consider the private and public aspects of social capital building.  Nevertheless, in applying 
the concept to social enterprises, the public aspect is emphasised (Evers, 2001; Laville and 
Nyssens, 2001) while the private aspect is ignored. 
Both draw attention to the way that sustainability (regardless of economic sector) is promoted 
by engagement across group boundaries (i.e. in the cross-over areas of the Billis model).  
The ability to develop relationships between, and not just within, social groups is regarded as 
paramount.  Kay (in Pearce, 2003) highlights that social capital can be deployed by one 
social group (or network) against others and is not, of itself, necessarily something deployed 
for the common good.  His rhetorical style, however, supports the idea that shared values 
create solidarity between like-minded entrepreneurs.  If there is an ideological commitment, it 
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is towards a new type of unitarist outlook amongst a new executive group rather than an 
advance towards a more pluralist form of social organisation (compare Darwin et al, 2002; 
Johnson, 2006).   
Furthermore, the claim that strong cultures based on „shared values‟ produce superior 
organisation performance is questionable.  The emancipatory promise held out in the 1980s 
(Ouchi, 1981; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Kanter, 1985) has not been unequivocally validated 
by later research (Kotter and Heskett, 1992; Kunda, 1992; Willmott, 1993; Thompson and 
Findlay, 1999; Ridley-Duff, 2005).  Moreover, recent analysis of the social enterprise sector 
not only fails to reveal widespread commitment to shared values, but considerable 
heterogeneity and mistrust between different constituencies (Wallace, 2005; Seanor, 2006; 
Seanor and Meaton, 2006). 
In assessing the role of social capital it is worth considering the way Mills and Clarke (1982) 
differentiate between exchange and communal relationships.  They argue that „exchange‟ 
relationships are based on trading material benefits.  Communal relationships, on the other 
hand, are rooted not just in trading material benefits, but also trading information and 
emotions that bring about mutual commitment.  Communal relationships have the capacity to 
survive disagreement and are characterised by higher levels of emotion and conflict 
combined with effective processes for reconciliation (see Aronson, 2003; Tjosvold et al, 
2005).  If social capital is „fragile‟, as suggested by Kay (2003), this may indicate that social 
capital has not been established: the relationship is still at the „exchange‟ rather than 
„communal‟ stage of development. 
Timberlake (2005) helpfully distinguishes between human and social capital to draw attention 
to the individual character of the former and the collective character of the latter.  She also 
pursues a debate about the way gender dynamics impact on access to social capital.   
Neergaard et al. (2005) go a step further.  In considering the gendered behaviours of 
entrepreneurs, attention is drawn not only to the way relationships exist on several levels, but 
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also how support is offered by close family and friends.  Both Timberlake (2005) and 
Morrison (2006:195) also draw attention to the social motives of entrepreneurs, and 
engagement in “lifestyle entrepreneurship”.  Here, the social entrepreneurship label is 
applied even when tackling social exclusion is not an objective.  While these studies re-open 
the question of friendship and family relationships as an integral support mechanism, none 
move away from the perspective that social capital has an instrumental character to be 
deployed by the entrepreneur for business gain. 
In Ridley-Duff (2005), the process by which social capital is built (and destroyed) is tracked 
using ethnographic research techniques in two social enterprises.  The counter-intuitive 
finding here was that social capital is developed through discussion of individuals‟ private, 
not public, lives and is most rapidly destroyed by attacking a person‟s private, and not their 
public, life.  The distinction between private and public was not so much blurred as intricately 
woven into a seamless fabric.  People talked about work at home, and home at work.  Many 
people were found to engage more at work, and outside the home, because their personal 
lives were unsatisfying, or in pursuit (or defence) of family/friendship networks that would be 
strengthened by work commitments and civic activities.  Conversely, people were found to 
withdraw from the workplace and civic engagement when attending to courtship and 
family-raising needs. 
The study reinforces the view of Farrell (1988) and Hearn and Parkin (1987:57) that sexual 
behaviour is “an ordinary and frequent public process rather than an extraordinary and 
predominately private process”.  For these authors, the way we walk, talk, dress and 
converse, the jobs and tasks we choose, as well as the way we perform them, are sexual 
strategies for maintaining and deflecting sexual interest.  In Ridley-Duff (2005, Chapters 4 - 
6), the way this subterranean world of sexual identity underpins workplace organisation, 
entrepreneurial behaviour and group conflict, is further exposed.  Social capital building, 
therefore, is infused with interpersonal dynamics through which we project, develop and 
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protect our social status and sexual identities (compare Goffman, 1969; Farrell, 1988; 
Collinson, 2003).  Even when we are not seeking sexual contact at work, our workplace 
activities and attitudes are guided by the need to maintain sexual and family relationships 
outside work, or service the outcome of past sexual relationships (i.e. obligations towards 
children and former partners). 
In the context of a debate about social capital, we are inevitably faced with a view that 
human behaviour in all spheres of life – both inside and outside the workplace - is a product 
of (as well as a support system for) our sexual attitudes and choices.  Theorising about social 
capital without linking the process to identity building, relationships and obligations, denies 
the extent to which organisations are complex centres of community-building where we 
satisfy a wide range of economic and social needs (Watson, 1994; Collinson, 2003). 
This is a significant departure from task-focussed economic models and profit-maximising 
behaviour of „rational man‟ derived from the writings of Smith (1776) and Friedman (1962).  
In traditional liberalism, the integrity of cognitive processes within each person is emphasised 
(see Gaus, 2003).  Group influences are denied, diminished, or regarded as a corrupting 
influence rather than a driving force.   The marginalisation of social thinking in economic 
theory finds expression in „utility value‟ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) „opportunistic behaviour‟ 
(Williamson, 1975) and threats to efficiency and profitability (Donaldson, 2005).  Even in 
Etzioni‟s (1988) model (one of the first to accept normative-affective elements as dominant 
rather than peripheral in business decision-making) the importance of sexual goals and 
obligations is understated.  A social enterprise, when its members tackle social exclusion 
either inside the organisation (through its governance arrangements) or within the wider 
community (through its actions and social network), self-consciously engages in both 
economic and social capital development.  The way this occurs is summarised in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 – Developing Social and Economic Capital 
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based on Ridley-Duff, 2005:271 
The above model draws on the concepts of economic rationality and social rationality 
(Ridley-Duff, 2005).  These should not be confused with rational choice theory (Homans, 
1961, Blau, 1964, Coleman, 1973), although there are some overlaps.  Economic rationality 
is here used to describe behaviour that is task-oriented and makes no presumption that tasks 
are pursued as a matter of self-interest.  The behaviour is considered economically rational if 
an action deliberately affects the likelihood of completing a task (regardless of the effect on 
the parties involved and whether this helps task completion).  For example, a deliberate act 
of industrial sabotage would hinder task completion, but would still have an underlying 
rationale. 
Similarly, social rationality is used to indicate behaviour that is relationship-oriented but 
makes no assumption that approval is sought.  Social rationality accepts that sometimes a 
change in a relationship is itself the end that is sought.  In this case, economic rationality 
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(task-oriented behaviour) can be a means rather than an end.  The behaviour is considered 
rational if it deliberately impacts on the level of intimacy in the relationship regardless of 
whether all parties perceive the outcome as positive.  While there are some echoes to the 
concepts of economic and social exchange, there are two key differences.  Firstly, economic 
and socially rationality can be applied at the individual, group or organisation level (i.e. it is 
regarded as both individual and collective in nature).   Secondly, the recursive nature of 
economic and social rationality implicates them in identity building and underlying social 
interests. 
The „world view‟ promoted here is that humans have both physical and emotional survival 
needs.  The former (physical life) is accommodated through economically rational 
(task-oriented) behaviour in which social rationality is deployed instrumentally.  Emotional 
survival is accommodated through socially rational (relationship-oriented) behaviour in which 
economic rationality is deployed instrumentally.  Both types of behaviour can be a means or 
an end.  The determining factor depends on the interests pursued and the meaning-making 
processes that bring them about (compare Habermas et al, 1974). 
Economic rationality (how we trade physical, intellectual and material assistance) affects the 
level of economic capital.  How we trade access to people, information and emotions (“social 
rationality”) affects the level of social capital.  The way that economic and social capital are 
conceptualised in Figure 3 argues that social capital is primarily a socio-emotional process – 
and end in itself – which is sometimes deployed politically in pursuit of a task.  If so, it is 
possible to reframe social enterprise as a business that operates from (or at least 
accommodates) socially rational perspectives to serve wider socio-emotional purposes. 
This clarifies several things.  Firstly, the mutuality believed to underpin social capital is fragile 
if personal bonds have not been cemented by reciprocal emotional exchanges (compare 
Kay, 2003).  Measuring inter-trading activities, therefore, is not necessarily a good indicator 
of social capital (although it can be one possible outcome).  The longevity of trading 
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relationships, and the number of disagreements or conflicts of interest that have been 
navigated successfully, are better measures (compare Neergaard et al, 2005). 
Secondly, the model clarifies the recursive nature of economic and social behaviour.  Any 
behaviour, when reciprocated, represents a thread that joins two people and potentially 
increases/decreases intimacy.  Most relationships develop slowly over time and are carefully 
constructed subsets of threads, formed or broken as a result of changing dependencies and 
restricted opportunities for intimacy.   
Groups of threads can be viewed as “bonds” that strengthen a relationship.  Changing 
patterns of interaction and thread building/breaking accounts for changes in behaviour, 
personality, motivation and performance.  As Neergaard et al. (2006) point out, the content of 
relationships and the multiplicity of levels on which they operates need to be known in order 
to understand how social capital affects behaviour.  This perspective has explanatory value 
when considering how behaviours change over time.  It is more dynamic than genetic or 
social inheritance explanations and accounts for rapid changes in behaviour that arise from 
changed intentions and opportunities at both inter-personal and inter-group levels (compare 
Goffman, 1969; Blumer, 1969). 
Clearly, further consideration of sexuality at work is a line for future enquiry and theory.  The 
argument in this paper limits itself to two key points.  Firstly, the social capital literature would 
benefit from paying greater attention the subterranean impact of sexuality in social capital 
development.  Secondly, the social enterprise literature would benefit from taking a holistic 
perspective on the social motives and purposes that underpin entrepreneurship. 
This brings us back to the Billis model. The extension originally proposed by Seanor and 
Meaton (2006) highlights the hybrid forms of organisation that can be viewed as socially 
enterprising.  What remains is further exploration of the impacts on social enterprise 
practices and to integrate the socio-sexual world into the model.  In the next section, 
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therefore, the argument is developed to synthesise these ideas into a final version of the 
model and use it to build a more robust typology of social enterprise. 
Implications 
The perspective articulated in this paper is that places of work provide the means by which 
communities of people sustain themselves and maintain their viability (compare Watson, 
1994; Berry, Broadbent and Otley, 1995; Cheney, 1999).  In contrast to the rationalist view 
(Friedman, 1962) of business organisation as the means by which a visionary entrepreneur 
completes a task or mission, or enables the consumer to purchase a good or service – the 
outcome is much more prosaic.  People organise for survival so long as their organisation 
meets their survival aspirations (and those of their families and dependants).  From this 
perspective, social enterprises increase their legitimacy when they self-consciously tackle 
social exclusion and bring people back into (or create) a viable community.  While it may 
appear self-evident, it should not be ignored that community survival requires that the 
community reproduce itself. 
The personal world identified by Billis (including socio-sexual aspirations) operates as an 
integral part of workplace practices in all three „worlds‟.  Seanor and Meaton (2006) 
demonstrate that social enterprises come into being, are expanded and scaled down, as a 
direct response to the aspirations and reactions of the people who run them.  When a social 
enterprise ceases to serve the multiple purposes of its members, the motivation to continue 
erodes (and sometimes evaporates completely) unless new people can be brought in to 
reinvigorate the organisation10. 
We need to consider this in light of the arguments set out earlier.  In that discussion, 
attention was drawn to contradictions in the way social enterprise is defined.  Firstly, there 
were arguments for a „non-profit‟ enterprise orientation; secondly for a „more-than-profit‟ 
outcome; lastly, Merck‟s river blindness drug project illustrated how corporate social 
responsibility can appear identical in form and substance to the other two.  Below (see 
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Figure 4) a model is outlined showing how these different views of social enterprise can be 
synthesised while respecting different ideological commitments. 
Moreover, multi-stakeholder co-operative and private business forms that have developed 
over recent decades (see Collins, 2001; Allen, 2005; Brown, 2006) sit at the centre of the 
model.  They are sufficiently distinctive to be recognised as different from government 
bodies, voluntary associations and private business.  They are also sufficiently distinctive to 
be recognised as different from trading charities, non-profit companies, and corporate social 
responsibilities projects.  This distinctiveness comes from a governance philosophy rooted in 
balancing the disciplines of social responsibility, participative governance and market 
success.  There are now a sufficient number of examples to argue that internalisation of 
Billis‟s three worlds into organisation governance offers a robust model for sustainability 
(Turnbull, 1994, 1995; Tam, 1999; Vinten, 2001; Wieland, 2005)..   
These ideas are integrated into the model in Figure 4.  Type A social enterprises, at the 
overlap of the governmental and voluntary association „worlds‟ stress a non-profit (or even 
anti-profit) ideology.  Typically this is expressed through constitutions that attempt to provide 
„asset-locks‟ to prevent the flight of capital from the organisation (as happens in a CIC or 
Company Limited by Guarantee) and they continue to prioritise grant and statutory funding 
regimes.  Type B social enterprises, however, stress investment in ethical and social trading 
in partnership with (or contracted by) government.  Here, investment is directed towards a 
specific social outcome (e.g. healthcare and housing) when initiated by government, or into 
ethical trading when initiated by private businesses pursuing regulated standards on 
environmental and social impact (e.g. corporate social responsibility).  Type C social 
enterprises are more geared to trading profitably to channel money into a social activity, 
deriving most income from market trading and fundraising from non-government sources.  
Here the focus is on business activity of a more conventional character, but with profits 
reinvested in (or distributed to) those who are socially excluded.  Lastly, type D social 
enterprises operate for-profit with explicit social objectives using governance practices that 
21 
emphasises voluntary action and association.  Mutual models (e.g. building societies), 
multi-stakeholder co-operatives (e.g. Mondragon, cited in Turnbull, 1994) and private 
businesses with multi-stakeholder governance models (e.g. Nucor, cited Collins, 2001) all fall 
into this category. 
Figure 4 – Integrating Social Rationality into the Billis Model 
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Instead of viewing „social enterprise‟ as a subset of the social economy, it can be viewed as 
a range of business practices that proactively build economic and social capital across the 
affected stakeholder groups.  As such, it regains an ideological character (and basis) that 
moves the definition away from „profit‟ based definitions towards an understanding of social 
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enterprise as the development of alternative business structures (and practices) that support 
socially rational objectives.   
We can reasonably expect a socially rational business to develop processes that build and 
distribute social and economic capital.  It may also plan its operations so that its surpluses 
are reinvested and/or distributed on a continual basis.  Its constitutional arrangements (or 
informal practices) will encourage reciprocal relationships that allow stakeholder group 
members to monitor performance measures relevant to their own social interests.  If it is 
doing this, Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) will reflect this.  Ideally, they also 
accommodate and resolve disagreement between stakeholder groups through debate. 
Stakeholder (pluralist democratic) control is less developed in UK law, particularly when 
compared to other countries that have statutory provisions for multi-stakeholder governance 
and/or strong co-operative sectors (Oakeshott, 1990; Holmstrom, 1993; Borzaga and 
Defourny, 2001).  European examples integrating stakeholder perspectives into corporate 
governance (Turnbull, 1995; Vinten, 2001; Wieland, 2005) have not yet shifted thinking in the 
UK away from the primacy of investor control and “enlightened shareholder value” 
(Friedman, 1962; Sternberg, 1998; DTI, 2005).  In light of this, Figure 4 posits that social 
entrepreneurs in Anglo-American cultures show a preference for Type A/B social enterprises 
that prioritise either private or social entrepreneurial business values (see Dart, 2004).  
In continental Europe, however, it is argued that „co-operative entrepreneurship‟ (Morrison, 
1991) results in a preference for Type C/D enterprises that stress surplus-sharing and/or 
democratic control (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001). 
However, the argument for risk-sharing/surplus-sharing models continues to grow in 
Anglo-American cultures even if they are perceived as outside the social enterprise 
mainstream.  Alternative arguments continue to be grounded in empirical research that 
organisation structures promoting „equilibrio‟ (balance) between individual and collective 
interests across stakeholder groups are epistemologically (and morally) robust while also 
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able to improve the double-bottom line (see Rothschild and De Whitt, 1986; Ellerman, 1990; 
Oakeshott, 1990; Turnbull, 1994; Major and Body, 2000; Collins, 2001; Allen, 2005; Brown, 
2006; Johnson, 2006; Jensen, 2006; Bull, 2006). 
Conclusions 
This brings us back to the original question.  Different groups pursue different social 
enterprise policy objectives.  At present, both governmental and entrepreneurial agendas 
have focussed on double or triple bottom line measures.  The emphasis remains on 
increased trading activity in a market as a means of reducing dependence or channelling 
more revenues into social policy objectives.  In the course of the paper, the argument has 
been developed for ways of thinking that consider the nature and quality of the relationships 
that are developed by a business as well as its economic viability 
Firstly, this was illustrated by outlining the range of opinion on social enterprise to highlight 
contradictions between „not-for-profit‟ and „more-than-profit‟ definitions.  Both arguments had 
such problems that a new model was offered to unravel why the social enterprise sector 
offers up multiple ideologies and practices.  Pluralist (multi-stakeholder) perspectives assume 
that managers are just one „pack‟ amongst many, and that all stakeholder groups experience 
their own perceptual limitations due to bounded rationality (Simons and Hawkins, 1949).  The 
objective in designing a governance system, therefore, changes.  Rather than focussing on 
developing the skills of a unitary board, „best practice‟ is re-oriented towards the integration 
and synthesis of devolved power centres through carefully crafted governance systems to 
allow conflicts to surface and be resolved through co-operative debate between the 
competing parties (Turnbull, 1994, 1995; Tam, 1999; Bull, 2006). 
In considering the motivations for co-operation, and the process of synthesis, this was 
extended to include debates about social capital, particularly the human desire for friendship, 
sexual relationships and family life.  Business schools may benefit from de-emphasising a 
task-orientated (mission-based) outlook of management to consider more holistic 
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explanations of enterprise activity and social identity development.  Profitability and a 
task-orientation can be seen as a means to an end and not always an end in themselves 
(compare Collins and Porras, 2000).  The primary ends can be increases in an organisation‟s 
capacity to trade physical, intellectual and material assistance (economic capital) in order to 
facilitate the development of emotional commitments (social capital).  Ironically, such an 
attitude may (particularly over the longer-term) come into conflict with contemporary 
employment law and social norms that are hostile to friendship and sexual desire as criteria 
for the recruitment and selection of organisation members. 
Nevertheless, a broadly defined twin goal of economic and social capital building can be 
viewed as a distinguishing attitude that differentiates the members (and policies) of some 
public, voluntary and private organisations from others and moves them towards a „social 
enterprise‟ orientation.  These attitudes contribute to sustainable development by promoting 
the satisfaction of both physical and emotional survival needs.  This may be combined with 
an antagonism towards those who seek the hegemony of the individual over the group (or 
vice versa) in favour of a negotiated balance that recognises both as legitimate. 
In social enterprise policy terms, the twin goal translates into particular ways of measuring 
success.  Social capital can be reported in terms of participation levels in governance, the 
development of intimate or sexual relationships as well as trading activities.  These become 
manifest through changes in the membership of the organisation, the accommodation of 
child-raising and caring responsibilities, increased tolerance toward sexual behaviours as 
well as the involvement of workers, customers and suppliers in decision-making.  Here, a 
stronger emphasis on the durability and level of activity in relationships (not just numbers) is 
paramount.   
In measuring economic performance, the amount of capital distributed and the diversity of 
the individuals and groups benefiting is a stronger measure of „success‟ than the precise 
level of profitability.  While there is a clear link to profitability, it distinguishes between those 
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that are focussed on capital accumulation at the expense of distribution (in which 
accumulation levels are high but distribution levels low), and those that accumulate for the 
purpose of distribution (in which both can be expected to remain high).  It might even be that 
capital accumulation becomes a measure of enterprise failure (and a basis for legal 
intervention) if the ratio of accumulation to capital distribution becomes too high. 
Lastly, an extension of the Billis model was proposed to accommodate and legitimise 
plurality.  Multi-stakeholder businesses – whether conceptualised as co-operative or private - 
have a unique position.  They seek (or are able) to sustain a balance of business, 
governance and socio-emotional objectives.  As such, it can be put forward as an ideal form 
of social enterprise: a business that accommodates social and economic rationality into its 
thinking and practices with the purpose of distributing social and economic capital across its 
stakeholder groups (rather than accumulating it from them). 
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